I am sure that it is too early to sum up the results of the incident, because RF has not yet responded with blow for blow. It will be something like this - the Kremlin will officially show softness, declare that "we are for peace and this tragedy is not a reason for war", and then very soon arrange a demonstration of its military potential for Turkey - at least it will shoot down a Turkish military plane or whatever is outside the state borders of Turkey but under the Turkish flag. Well, various embargoes and so on ... So let's not guess on the coffee grounds, but wait for the situation to continue to deteriorate
I see two options for the development of events, I note that one of them, officially recognized with pleasure, is completely bad, the second is a bit easier, but it will not affect the situation ...
I'll start with the last one: the Turks the plane was not shot down, this is evidenced by the violation of the ethics of the situation and confused messages, either from the ground, or Turkish fighters. The plane was shot down by the Syrian Turkmen from the ground ...
And Ankara took the blame. Why? The Turkmens are a stratum between the Kurds and Turkey, a convoy of oil, then that the Aerospace Forces in Syria is bombing everything that moves, for which they reproached Russia more than once, and if this is confirmed, it will only untie the hands of the Aerospace Forces, they say there is no moderate opposition ... And Turkey? What are we going to do to Turkey? Will we stop buying tomatoes? Build a Turkish stream? Will we block tourism in winter? ....
The first option, a deliberate attack, leads to the following:
The Turks could not take such a step on their own, which means a provocation by NATO. Russia pulled up air defense systems and promised to shoot down everything that is already moving in the sky. Logically, the next step of this provocation is to shoot down a NATO plane ..... an occasion and a situation will be created
So far, we can only talk about the rather general consequences of the incident and the situation around it:
First, in the medium term, or quite possibly, in the long term, bilateral relations between Russia and Turkey will undergo a cooling ( neither the first nor the last in modern history) and go into a state of stagnation or consequent deterioration. Claims against Turkey, about which they previously preferred not to speak at all or to speak more quietly, will now take their place in the official political discourse. Those. what Yevgeny Satanovsky was talking about earlier on TV, perhaps, basically only Yevgeny Satanovsky, will now sound from every "talking head" on the TV screen.
Second, economic cooperation between the two countries will probably not expand in the foreseeable future, but the existing articles of interaction will remain at the same level. Against this background, cooperation in the field of security, since the security forces in both countries are responsible for it, it will come down to a minimum.
Third, long-term large-scale projects, such as the construction of a nuclear power plant and a gas pipeline, have been frozen for quite a long time already due to the internal political crisis in Turkey itself. Despite the end of the electoral battles and the victory of the Justice and Development Party in the fall of 2015, neither the ratification of the agreements on the "Turkish Stream", nor the negotiations on it were resumed. In this direction, two options are possible: everything will remain unchanged and the state of "freeze" will be extended (in fact, this is the lesser of evils, beneficial to both parties), or, as some groups of the Russian elite really want, these projects will have a final point ... The lack of stability in Erdoan's policy has already bored the Russian establishment enough.
Fourth, "tourist" diplomacy, namely the use of some recommendations / prohibitions / restrictions to prevent Russians from relaxing in Turkey as a tool of influence / pressure, most likely (if used) will only be used until the start of the next vacation season. In winter 2015/2016, the economic situation in the country will not allow a significant part of potential tourists to leave the country for reasons of economy or lack of funds as such. But by the summer of 2016, political decisions in this direction (if any) may be revised.
Fifthly, the negotiation process will become more complicated 1) within the framework of creating a coalition against ISIS, an alternative to that coalition. what operates under the auspices of the United States; 2) within the framework of coordinating the actions of the coalition and the alliance with the participation of Russia.
Sixth, in society both in Turkey and in Russia, phobias against each other are growing. In the Russian Federation, the aspirations of the media and other sources of information, with the light hand of the President (after his speech before the meeting with the Jordanian monarch) formed a sharply negative attitude towards the Turkish leadership, which is quite easy to turn into aggression against all Turks. In Turtsii, patriotic sentiments are spreading in support of their president and prime minister, as well as the army, but the voices of those who are beginning to fear retaliatory actions by the Russian Federation are also loud enough. Disputes between politicians is one thing, but a fundamental split in the public mutual perception of each other between Russians and Turks is another. This is perhaps the most serious and far-reaching outcome of the SU-24 incident, which must be overcome, but it can be quite difficult.
It is important to note that both sides - I'm talking about the official political leadership both countries, - today they do not have complete freedom of action and are rather rigidly dependent on a number of various subjective factors.
So, the fact that as a result of an attack on an aircraft one of the pilots died (moreover, at the hands of militants irregular formations), obliges both President V. Putin and the Russian government to harsh rhetoric and retaliatory measures, otherwise they risk losing the trust of the citizens of their own country, which is much more valuable to them than the recognition of any external actor. In the meantime, one can observe that the Russian leadership is sending certain signals to the Turkish leaders: a hint that if the Turkish president or prime minister makes an apologetic speech, the Russian side is ready for negotiations (read, hush up the situation or resolve it by mutual agreement) , sounded openly in the speech of the head of the Russian Foreign Ministry on 11/25/2015, and in the words of a number of other representatives of the Russian state on 11/24/2015.
But the rhetoric of R. Erdoan and A. Davutoglu is aimed at their own population and partners in NATO. Erdoan, even if he is not behind the organization of the "ambush" (a word used by S. Lavrov on November 25, 2015 at a press conference at the Foreign Ministry) on a Russian plane, cannot condemn his servicemen on the very first day after the incident, risking being accused of treason national interests of Turkey. The AKP's victory in the last elections does not guarantee Erdoan control not only over parliament, the state and public opinion, but also over his own party. The growing contradictions between him and Prime Minister Davutoglu are increasingly questioning their feigned nature. Having their own fears, concerns, interests and needs, Turkish leaders are guided by a logic that does not always immediately become full of a professional politician, let alone ordinary citizens, journalists, etc.
The dynamism of the development of processes and dissemination of information in the present moment is detrimental to a balanced analysis of the situation and the adoption of detailed decisions by both parties. Under these conditions, unexpected and sometimes very contradictory actions can be taken that can harm the objective interests of both parties in the long term.
No longer "if" ... This threatens to close (albeit temporary) the second largest outbound tourism market for Russians and troubles for the tourism industry. In the geopolitical sense, all parties are making efforts to prevent this incident from becoming the beginning of a large-scale confrontation between the Russian Federation and NATO, and so far, it seems, everyone has an understanding that escalation is now in no one's interests